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Mr. Syahrul Hidayat University of Exeter / University of Indonesia
Moderation and the stagnation 
of the PKS in the 2009  
legislative election 
A Mixed Outcome 
The Indonesian election in 2009 has revealed two different results for the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
or Prosperous Justice Party). On the one hand, the party benefited from the personality of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s (SBY) PD (Partai Demokrat or Democrat Party), who helped to boost support from just 
7.5 percent to 21 percent: by contrast, other parties suffered from declining support. Accordingly, the 
PKS was able to maintain its percentage of the vote from the previous election, making it the fourth 
largest party in the Indonesian parliament as well as the biggest Islamic party. On the other hand, in 
urban areas the party did not perform as well as it had in 2004, slipping into second or third place 
in the election table in the five biggest cities: especially Jakarta and Depok. The PKS owed much to 
provinces in Central and East Java as well as Sumatra and Kalimantan where it gained more votes as 
the loss of votes in urban areas was compensated by votes gained in other areas. 
In order to understand why the party performed badly in big cities, it is necessary to consider voting 
patterns in urban areas as a distinctive phenomenon rather than looking at the party’s performance 
more generally. This is a relevant concern since urban voters have traditionally favoured the party. 
Therefore, this essay offers an understanding of why support for the party has stagnated in cities by 
focusing on the urban context. For that purpose I make use of a moderation framework, which can 
be applied to an ideological party such as the PKS in democratic processes. 
Moderation Analysis
In Parties and Party System: A Framework for Analysis (1976), Giovanni Sartori argues that the 
existence of ideological parties is not impossible since they can accept and follow the general rules 
of democratic processes. Parties can either preserve or reduce their ideological standpoints in order 
to initiate centrifugal or centripetal tendencies. The former occurs if a party maintains its ideological 
stance, which has the effect of limiting its opportunities to gain popular support, while the latter occurs 
if a party moves toward the centre of the political spectrum. 
Centripetal parties (which is to say ideological parties that work within democratic systems) need to 
sacrifice their ideological stance in order to integrate themselves into the system. In this way, they 
shift toward the centre for the purposes of winning elections. In this centripetal process of political 
moderation a political party with a radical position, platform or ideology, involved in an electoral 
process, moves to a median position.
The motivations behind this shift may be pragmatic-strategic or ideological or a mixture of both. The 
first is driven by a desire to win elections in pursuit of political office. Moderation, then, is seen as 
an effort to attract median voters and its achievement depends on whether it is convincing or not. 
The second reason for moderation is based on the development of new interpretations of a standing 
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ideology. Shifting a political stance may be seen as 
a consequence of new understandings of existing 
values. In the context of an Islamic society, new 
interpretations are necessary in order to develop 
moderate attitudes, which can be put into practice 
in political arena such as building democracy in an 
Islamic society. However, Jillian Schwedler’s case 
studies in Faith in Moderation (2006) confirmed that 
interpretation on certain political situations can be 
developed through religious perspectives. 
Despite the debates on what motivates moderation, 
sacrificing some aspects of an ideological standpoint 
is a necessary precondition. But this may not be an 
easy option as it could cause internal conflicts within 
parties that take this option. Occasionally this may 
cause splits and the establishment of splinter parties; 
in the wider context, this situation may confuse 
the party’s potential supporters, especially in the 
electoral process. 
Appealing to Voters 
In the 2004 election, the PKS was thought to be a 
rising star alongside Partai Demokrat. Its support 
grew from 1.4 percent of the vote in 1999 to 7.34 
percent in 2004, gaining it 45 parliamentary seats. It 
also became the most popular party in Jakarta, the 
capital, and other four major cities. One reason for 
this achievement was the image of the PKS as a party 
supporting good governance and morally grounded 
politics, which struck a chord with voters’ demands 
for change. However, the party’s use of the slogan 
‘clean and care’ may have reflected an understanding 
that its Islamic-appeal did not necessarily guarantee 
its electability. 
The PKS’s main approach to improving its image 
during the election was through sporadic canvassing 
in urban districts. By contrast, it did not make great 
use of a media strategy. But the party benefited most 
from public demand for alternatives to the older 
parties, which were widely seen as corrupt. 
Following upon its success in the 2004 election, the 
PKS adopted a strategy of using the mass media to 
promote itself in rural areas: this was influenced by 
the success of the presidential and vice presidential 
candidates, SBY-Kalla, who used similar strategies in 
the 2004 presidential election in order to compensate 
for their inability to penetrate rural areas through 
party networks. In fact, media promotion was the 
dominant campaign strategy, operated by all major 
political parties in the 2009 election. The ambition 
of the PKS to become a major party by gaining 
20 percent of the vote in 2009 encouraged it to 
implement a more extensive campaign strategy, using 
a mixture of media, more traditional door-to-door 
campaigns, and its trademark social care activities. 
In this way, the PKS tried to advertise itself as an 
inclusive, but also nationalist party, ready to accept 
and recognise different groups within Indonesian 
society. In February 2008, the party held a National 
Summit in Bali, specifically because the island is 
dominated by Hindus and a favourite destination 
for tourists, in order to show its enthusiasm for 
recognising different identities. During the summit 
one of the MPs symbolically invited a Hindu preacher 
to join the party in order to express this eagerness. 
Furthermore, in order to show the nationalist spirit of 
the party, ‘freedom’ (merdeka) was shouted together 
with ‘Allahu Akbar’ during the party’s meetings.
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However, the party courted controversy when it 
declared the former president, Soeharto, who was 
accused of corruption and held by some to be 
responsible for political crimes, a national hero and 
guru. This move reflected the party’s strategy to 
extend its support beyond its traditional basis. The 
party also made use of other significant figures in its 
advertising, designed to represent different segments 
of Indonesian society, including Soekarno, the first 
president who was known for his nationalistic and 
progressive ideas, as well as Ahmad Dahlan and 
Hasyim Asy’ari the founder of two Islamic social 
organisations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. 
Impact on the PKS
The media campaign operated by the PKS in 2009 
raised confusion and controversy, not least because it 
clashed with the message of change promoted by the 
party in the previous election. For potential supporters 
in big cities, the new message might not have been 
understood quite so easily since it seemed to run 
contrary to the ‘clean and care’ slogan used by the 
party in 2004, as well as its more basic Islamic identity. 
For those who wanted to vote for change, as shown 
by the previous election, admiration of the former 
president could be seen as a betrayal of the spirit of 
reformasi. This mainly affected voters in big cities who 
were more critical and demanding and who tended 
to have better access to mass media. Therefore, 
when a party does not fit their demands, they are 
less likely to vote for it. The controversy raised by the 
messages delivered through the mass media was to 
some extent good for the party since it increased its 
public profile. However, this did not ensure support 
for it at the ballot box, as was demonstrated by the 
results of the election in urban areas. 
This strategy caused difficulties for party cadres 
working at the grass-roots level in big cities, who 
frequently found themselves confronted by hostile 
questions from potential voters about the election 
strategy being operated by the party. This was not 
helped by the fact that the cadres themselves often 
could not account for the party line that they were 
supposed to represent. 
The direction and behaviour of the party in politics, 
especially during the electoral campaign, became 
a serious concern for some of its members. Some 
members, mainly in Jakarta and its suburban cities, 
responded to criticisms of how the party had 
developed its image in the mass media by creating 
several forums to discuss this situation, especially 
before the election. The al Hikmah mosque in 
southern Jakarta hosted monthly open gatherings, 
attended by at least 300 party cadres, in order to 
discuss the direction of the party. This led some of 
the attendees to form a further discussion group, the 
Forum Kader Peduli (Forum of Concerned Cadres), 
in order to discuss the situation more intensively and 
to formulate action plans. Although limited in size, 
these groups were attended by a mixture of middle-
ranking and senior party members who invited more 
junior members along in order to disperse the content 
discussed in the group more widely.
 
The general feeling of these groups was that the party 
campaign strategy had violated its identity by putting 
political success before religious considerations. 
Their members accused a number of the party’s 
leaders of initiating a new campaign strategy without 
consulting or engaging with the concerns of its 
middle-ranking and junior members. Therefore there 
was a prevailing spirit of questioning the party’s 
leadership, which spread from middle-ranking to 
more junior party members. 
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As a cadre party, with a strong training system based on certain values, uncontrollable 
discourses within the system can become quite influential. Although its has been estimated 
that only around ten percent of the party’s cadres have been openly critical of it, this internal 
dissent can affect the morale of other cadres who are less inclined to openly criticise the 
party. Additionally, working for the party can be tiring for cadres; hence criticism of the 
party from within can make them feel disinclined to promote the party to the electorate. 
It has been found that the level of enthusiasm to work for the party varies according to 
how its members perceive its direction. While the majority of cadres continued working 
passionately for the party during the 2009 election, there were also members who were 
less enthusiastic about campaigning or even did not want to work at all. In an extreme 
case, one former cadre declared that he would campaign against the party. 
Conclusion
The 2009 election showed the growing anxiety and suspicion of some cadres toward 
the PKS leadership and how this influenced their dedication towards the party’s election 
strategy. This stands in stark contrast to the 2004 election, when almost all of cadres 
campaigned enthusiastically for the party. The more pragmatic direction of the party’s 
2009 election campaign left some of its members confused, concerned, and critical of 
its leaders. This also left potential voters in big cities confused as to what the party stood 
for. The efforts of the party leadership to moderate the image of the PKS resulted in 
internal tensions and a confused message, the outcome of which was stagnation in the 
2009 election. ■
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